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Introduction
This paper exploits recent empirical ﬁndings to investigate the relation between trade inte-
gration, ﬁnancial integration and the correlation of business cycles in the euro area. Since
the early 1990s, measures have been implemented to eliminate restrictions on European
capital markets and increase their amalgamation. Well-functioning ﬁnancial markets fa-
cilitate the eﬃcient allocation of resources and therefore spur economic growth; moreover,
capital markets integration increases the risk sharing possibilities faced by individuals and
their chance to hedge against idiosyncratic shocks. The relevance of this latter aspect
has been growing together with the project of an European monetary union, as capital
mobility is one of the standard criteria proposed by optimum currency area (OCA) theory.
Recent empirical work (Imbs, 2004) suggests that more ﬁnancially integrated countries
display more correlated business cycles. This has interesting and important implications
for the euro area as it would mean that ﬁnancial integration reduces the costs of a single
monetary policy and therefore provides European policymakers with yet another reason
to purse capital markets integration. On more theoretical ground, this view supports the
hypothesis that optimum currency areas are endogenous.
The static nature of traditional OCA criteria has been ﬁrst emphasized by Frankel
and Rose (1998): they stress the need to account for the self reinforcing eﬀects set in
motion by the use of a common currency when weighting costs and beneﬁts of monetary
integration. More speciﬁcally, they assume that currency unions increase bilateral trade
and ﬁnd a positive relation between international movement of goods and business cycles
correlation.
1The eﬀect of monetary unions on trade ﬂows has been thoroughly investigated in the
last few years, following the pioneering contribution by Rose (2000).
This result is far from trivial as the relationship between exchange rate volatility and
international trade is one of the unsettled issues in the empirical trade literature (see for
instance Clark et al., 2004). Both Rose (2000) and his followers control for exchange rate
volatility, but while the latter seems not to play a prominent role, the eﬀect of a common
currency is marked and robust. A recent paper by Baldwin et al. (2005) presents a possible
explanation for this puzzle by means of a monopolistic competition model where the eﬀect
of exchange rate volatility on trade is nonlinear, getting larger as volatility approaches
zero. The result is due to the fact that a reduction in exchange rate uncertainty rises both
sales per exporting ﬁrm and the number of enterprises that decide to serve the foreign
market. Hence, this convex relation between trade and exchange rate uncertainty can be
captured by a linear volatility measure plus a currency union dummy (which represents
the usual set up of empirical models employed to analyze the phenomenon).
The claim that increased commercial integration lowers the cost of a single monetary
policy through its eﬀect on GDP synchronization seems therefore well established. So
much so that nowadays trade is customarily included among the determinants of GDP
correlation, as it is conﬁrmed by recent work by Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004).
Thus far research concerned with the endogenous eﬀects of a currency union has almost
exclusively focused on the trade channel, while other possible sources of endogeneity have
not been directly explored. A notable exception is De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) who
present a preliminary attempt to investigate such eﬀects in four broad areas: economic
integration (prices and trade), ﬁnancial integration and risk sharing, output synchroniza-
tion, product and labor market ﬂexibility. What emerges from this survey is a rather
confused picture where —apart from the already mentioned trade channel— very little
has been done and mainly in a non-systematic way. Most often empirical works investi-
gating the eﬀect of the euro on say, ﬁnancial markets, do not link these developments with
other aspects of OCA theory and just highlight the increased capital market integration
that has followed the launch of the single currency (Baele et al., 2004).
By exploiting a number of recent empirical contributions, this paper addresses the ﬁ-
nancial side of the endogeneity story: the identiﬁcation of a second endogenous mechanism
2with the potential of making EMU more justiﬁable ex-post than ex-ante represents the
main contribution of this work.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses in more details the notion
of endogeneity with respect to OCA theory and provides a context for the rest of the
analysis. Section II reviews recent empirical contributions that constitute the building
blocks for our work, while section III describes the data and the econometric methodology
employed. Results are presented in section IV. Then the paper turns to investigate the
relation between ﬁnancial integration and sectoral growth (section V), while the last part
discusses the main conclusions and identiﬁes some avenues for further research.
I Sources of endogeneity
In the 40 years that have elapsed since Mundell’s (1961) seminal article that marked its
birth, OCA theory has undergone several diﬀerent phases (see Mongelli, 2002). Along this
span of time the focus has shifted from the early interest on the properties that would
best deﬁne the domain of a monetary union to the current attempt to operationalize OCA
criteria. This evolution has been characterized by two major events: the identiﬁcation of
a unifying, ‘catch all’ criterion —the similarity of shocks— that subsumes most, if not all,
of the diﬀerent properties proposed by the literature, and the recognition that monetary
uniﬁcation is likely to set in motion a number of feedback loops that change ex post a
country’s suitability for entry into a currency union and therefore make the domain of a
currency area endogenous.
Exposure to asymmetric shocks
Owing to the original use of the notion by Frankel and Rose (1998), in the context of OCA
theory endogeneity is normally taken to mean a change, triggered by the adoption of a
single currency, in the nature of the shocks faced by member countries. This in turn alters
the costs and beneﬁts associated with the surrender of monetary independence. Frankel
and Rose ﬁnd that by enhancing trade integration, the use a common currency increases
business cycles synchronization and therefore reduces the need to operate exchange rate
adjustments (to have an independent monetary policy).
3This is of course not the only possible source of endogeneity. A second relevant channel
—which has not been thoroughly investigated so far— is represented by capital markets.
International ﬁnancial integration holds a prominent place in the theory of OCA: in his
original contribution Mundell (1961) deﬁnes the optimum domain of a monetary union as
one in which there is full mobility of factors of production. By substituting for exchange
rate movements, in fact, factor mobility has equilibrating eﬀects in the wake of local
asymmetric shocks and reduces the costs associated with the loss of monetary sovereignty.
Ingram (1962) notes that high capital mobility can substitute for exchange rate movements
and buﬀer the economy from adverse temporary shocks. This notion is further developed
in Mundell (1973), where the future Nobel Prize winner discusses the role of international
risk sharing via cross-country holding of assets.
Whilst these approaches suggest that ceteris paribus capital mobility lowers the costs
associated with permanently ﬁxing the exchange rate and loosing control over monetary
policy, we recognize the all the rest will not be equal: the introduction of a single currency
is going to have profound eﬀects on ﬁnancial markets and to feed back from here into the
system.
The ﬁrst (trivial) point to note is that the elimination of exchange rate risk will sweep
away one of the main determinant of market segmentation, increase asset substitutability
and therefore raise the mobility of capital. Hence, the threshold level of ex ante ﬁnancial
integration required for the beneﬁts of monetary uniﬁcation to outweigh associated costs,
is reduced by means of this process of cumulative causation.
The second channel replicates the mechanism highlighted by Frankel and Rose (1998)
in the case of trade. Recent empirical ﬁndings in fact point to the fact that ﬁnancially
integrated economies tend to display more tightly correlated cycles (see section II for a
review of relevant contributions).
A third point, which is related to the previous one, concerns the eﬀect of European
integration, and of monetary uniﬁcation in particular, on sectoral specialization patterns.
Whilst there is no reason to believe that a mere change in the unit of account will spur
any particular dynamics, wider market access and deeper ﬁnancial markets are likely to
trigger some adjustments.
Most models in international trade theory predict that a reduction in transaction costs
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tor abundance (Heckscher-Ohlin model), economies of scale (new trade theory) or of loca-
tion (new economic geography). A similar conclusion holds also for ﬁnancial integration
and follows from the risk-sharing argument reviews above: capital markets integration
—allowing for cross-border ownership of assets and means of production— relaxes the
trade-oﬀ between specialization and the insurance properties of a diversiﬁed portfolio of
industrial sectors. While concentrating on more productive sectors grants higher returns,
it makes the system more exposed to asymmetric shocks; ﬁnancial integration would then
provide agents with better insurance against (nonsystemic) production risk and therefore
enhance specialization.
Albeit this apparent homogeneity among the predictions of diﬀerent theories, there
are a few caveats to note. First, Br¨ ulhart (2001) claims that the new economic geography
paradigm postulates multiple equilibria and path dependency: it may well be that the
existing pre-EMU economic structure constitutes a stable conﬁguration and therefore does
not change.
Second, even assuming that sectoral specialization occurs, Br¨ ulhart and Traeger (2005)
make an important distinction between the international concentration postulated by tra-
ditional trade theories and the neoclassical growth model and the intranational clustering
predicted by new economic geography. Only the ﬁrst kind of specialization would in fact
raise the cost of a single monetary policy because, assuming shocks are sectoral, country
are more likely to display asymmetric cycles and therefore would call for diversiﬁed policy
actions. On the contrary, agglomeration within a country poses no problem in terms of
macroeconomic management1.
Last, while most studies investigating the impact of European (monetary) integration
on national industrial structures assume that more specialized economies display less syn-
chronized cycles, this is not necessarily true, at least on theoretical grounds. Obstfeld
(1994) for instance sets up an open economy model whereby international ﬁnancial inte-
gration encourages all countries to shift away from low return, safe investment to high
yielding, risky one. The same could happen once capital market integration allows ﬁrms
that operate in risky sectors and are therefore more dependent on external ﬁnance to
have a wider access to ﬁnancial funds. In this case European countries would experience
5simultaneously both increased specialization and increased similarity of their industrial
structure.
In this section we have discussed endogeneity in the sense of a feedback loop from mon-
etary integration to business cycle correlation and we have identiﬁed three main channels
through which this can occur: trade integration, ﬁnancial integration and industrial spe-
cialization. Though this notion of endogeneity is the most common in the context of OCA
theory —and it is the one to which we will refer throughout the rest of the essay— these are
not the only mechanisms by which the decision to surrender exchange rate independence
may aﬀect ex post the costs and beneﬁts of monetary uniﬁcation.
Transmission of shocks and policy responses
Exposure to asymmetric shocks may not be the sole reason why members of a currency
union are out of phase. Farina and Tamborini (2004) for instance present an interesting
model where, given the institutional design of EMU2, the main culprit lies in the presence
of structural asymmetries.
The most trivial case is one in which there are asymmetries in the propagation of the
shocks. From the point of view of macroeconomic management this is tantamount to the
presence of asymmetric shocks and therefore does not deserve separate consideration.
The second case is one in which there are structural asymmetries in the transmission
of monetary policy. The budgetary limits imposed upon ﬁscal authorities entails that
automatic stabilizers alone are not able to fully stabilize the economy, so that some resid-
ual volatility will be transmitted to the whole monetary union and trigger central bank
intervention. Then, as a result of diﬀerent monetary policy transmission mechanisms,
the common optimal monetary policy does not ﬁt all countries and may even generate
‘perverse’ outcomes whereby cross-country dispersion of output gaps increases.
One of the key assumption underlying Farina and Tamborini’s result is that automatic
stabilizers cannot completely oﬀset the impact of a shock. Such occurrence would be
magniﬁed in the event that the existence of persistent regional disparities calls for sub-
stantial public intervention, absorbs a relevant share of national budget expenditures and,
in presence of binding deﬁcit limits, ends up reducing the amount of resources available for
stabilization purposes3. This is a case where intra-national agglomeration and clustering,
6if resulting in a perpetuation of regional imbalances, may in fact pose some problems and
increase the cost of a monetary union
The last reason to believe that monetary integration may aﬀect the response of the
economy to shocks is its potential eﬀect on monetary policy transmission mechanisms.
Deeper ﬁnancial integration is likely to have an impact not only on the substitutability
among assets issued in diﬀerent countries, but also on the institutional and legal framework
governing ﬁnancial ﬂows, the functioning of ﬁnancial markets and the transmission of
monetary policy impulses. Using Farina and Tamborini’s terminology one can imagine
that, via its eﬀect on ﬁnancial market integration, the introduction of a single currency
reduces the structural asymmetries that tend to cause ‘perverse’ eﬀects of monetary policy.
The main diﬀerence between the ‘endogeneities’ described in the previous section and
those reviewed here lies in the fact that the latter originate in the interaction between the
adoption of a single currency and the institutional design regulating the functioning of a
particular currency area. On the contrary, one can regard the former as having a more
general content and applying to every monetary union. For this reason —since the main
aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on OCA theory rather than discussing the
institutional set up of the EMU— in what follows we will focus exclusively on the ﬁrst
type of endogenous eﬀects, i.e. the feedback loop from monetary integration to business
cycle correlation, placing particular emphasis on the role of ﬁnancial integration.
II A glance at the existing literature
Now that we have established a framework of reference for our work, we turn to a selected
overview of recent (chieﬂy empirical) contributions that constitute the starting point and
the foundations of our work. Once the results presented hereafter are related one with
the other and applied to the European context, the hypothesis of an endogenous channel
working through capital market integration emerges almost naturally.
Relevant contributions can be classiﬁed in three broad families according to their main
focus: a) determinants of output correlation and the emergence of a European business
cycle; b) the impact of EMU on European capital markets; c) the relation between ﬁnancial
integration and GDP synchronization.
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To the ﬁrst group belong the papers that investigate the determinants of business cycles
correlation such as Otto et al. (2001) and Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004). The former
identiﬁes three channels of transmission: trade, ﬁnance and policy coordination. Their
empirical analysis is based on a cross-section of 17 OECD countries and moves from simple
bivariate regressions to multivariate speciﬁcations. Results conﬁrm an important role
for trade, less robust performance by ﬁnance (whose signiﬁcance depends on the chosen
measure), whilst policy coordination and specialization patterns are not signiﬁcant.
Similar results can be found in Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004) who apply extreme-
bounds analysis to check the robustness of several proposed explanatory variables. Al-
though they do not include ﬁnancial integration among the variables whose impact on
synchronization is tested, they do include a dummy for currency unions, but ﬁnd that this
indicator is not robust as it is signiﬁcant only when other variables are not included in
the regression. Something similar holds true for the industrial structure as well, whereas
bilateral trade explains a relevant part of business cycles correlation.
Alesina et al. (2002) show that currency unions do not bring about co-movements in
output, while there is a signiﬁcant impact on trade and the co-movement of prices. Along
the same line, Doyle and Faust (2003) question the very link between economic integration
and output correlation. The paper focuses on formal tests for changes in the synchroniza-
tion of macroeconomic variables (GDP, consumption and investment growth rates) among
G7 countries and claims that despite the large increase in economic integration experi-
enced in the last decade, there is no evidence of a signiﬁcant shift in correlations. This
is especially striking in the case of Canada and the US, as NAFTA has dramatically in-
creased trade linkages among the two countries; euro area countries in the sample (France,
Germany and Italy) display no evidence of a rise in correlation.
Similarly, Camacho et al. (2005) use a mixture of measures of ‘distance’ between
monthly industrial production indexes to ﬁnd that international economies have become
less synchronized in the last 15 years. The authors also claim that it is not possible to
identify one (or two) countries acting as an attractor for EMU area members and that
the strong correlation between European countries predates the introduction of the euro.
While these are interesting ﬁndings, the paper does not shed much light on the impact of
8EMU on output correlation.
With respect to the latter point, Rose and Engel (2002) ﬁnd that business cycles are
more highly synchronized across countries that share a common currency than across
countries retaining monetary sovereignty. This brings us to the question of the existence
of a European business cycle. The question has been much debated in the second half of
the last decade, Artis and Zhang (1997) being the usual reference. That paper presents
evidence showing that correlation has increased along with international integration. In a
later contribution Artis (2003) starts from a slightly diﬀerent question and instead of asking
whether the cycles of European countries have become closer and better synchronized, it
investigates whether it is possible to identify a European cycle. He concludes that that is
not the case as European countries are split in two groups, while Japan and the US are
often associated with core EMU countries.
Darvas and Szap´ ary (2004) ﬁnd evidence that EMU member countries have become
more synchronized over time, especially since 1993, i.e. in the run-up period that predated
the third stage of EMU. The authors qualify this ﬁnding noting that, as the same phe-
nomenon holds true also for non-EMU European countries and the US, it may be more
the result of the emergence of a world business cycle rather than an endogenous euro
eﬀect. Nonetheless, both the fact that peripheral EMU countries are moving toward the
synchronization levels enjoyed by core countries and that also traditionally less correlated
components of GDP (e.g. private consumption) have experienced increased synchroniza-
tion, tend to support the endogeneity argument (Darvas and Szap´ ary, 2004, p. 28).
Jansen and Stokman (2004) focus on the role of FDI and and ﬁnd that after 1995 they
are much better able to explain the pattern of international business cycles linkages than
trade relation4. Hence, they claim, FDI can be regarded as a separate channel through
which economic systems aﬀect each other.
European capital markets after the euro
The second stream of literature relevant for our work is concerned with the impact of the
euro on ﬁnancial markets.
Generally speaking, elimination of exchange rate risk is likely to enhance substitutabil-
ity among securities issued in diﬀerent countries, and to increase transparency. This in
9turn facilitates competition and arbitrage and thus reduces the cross-sectional dispersion
of prices and returns. Moreover, using a single unit of account removes currency matching
requirements for ﬁnancial intermediaries and therefore spurs cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows.
In an early study, Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001) claim that the euro contributed to
reduce ﬁnancial market segmentation by relaxing technical, regulatory and psychological
constraints that had been hindering integration until 1999. They ﬁnd that the introduction
of the single currency had a particularly quick and pronounced impact on bond markets.
Very similar conclusions are reach by Hartman et al. (2003), who again stress the impact on
the corporate bond market and the increased substitutability among government securities.
Karlinger (2002) reviews the welfare implications of the impact of common currencies
on ﬁnancial markets and, in so doing, evaluates the ﬁrst years of EMU. The author con-
cludes that EMU has encouraged integration of European capital markets both directly
(through the elimination of currency risk and standardization of contracts) and indirectly
(by reducing the cost of cross-country transactions and fostering competition in the bank-
ing sector).
A comprehensive assessment of the impact of EMU on ﬁnancial markets is presented
by Baele et al. (2004). They analyze recent developments in ﬁve euro area market sectors
and ﬁnd that these display diﬀerent levels of integration. In particular, while the money
market has almost fully converged after the introduction of the single currency and it is
the segment where integration has proceeded the most, important barriers to international
investment still remain in the equity market. Within these two extremes there are the
markets for government and corporate bonds and the credit market. Yields on euro area
sovereign securities have become increasingly driven by common news, but there still exist
signiﬁcant spreads among assets with identical credit rating and maturity. The most
striking feature of the market for corporate bonds is the wider access gained by low-
rated non-ﬁnancial institutions. Moreover, once pervasive risk is taken into consideration,
country of issuance has little power in explaining yield spreads. Much less integrated
appears the retail banking market, where price diﬀerentials remain relatively high.
With respect to international diversiﬁcation, Baele et al. (2004) quote some evidence
already put forward by Adam et al. (2002) and update it. Both studies report that the
introduction of the single currency is associated with a large increase in the asset share
10of funds characterized by an international investment strategy. More interestingly for the
present purpose, despite being characterized by diﬀerent levels of integration, all sectors
have shown a marked increase in integration, thus backing the maintained hypothesis that
monetary unions facilitate cross-border capital ﬂows.
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) arrive to the same conclusion when addressing the so
called Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. They show that the correlation between domestic saving
and investment has declined over time, especially in the euro area. As in a world of
perfect capital markets the two macroeconomic variables should be independent of each
other, this decline testiﬁes to higher integration in ﬁnancial markets. With the help of
a simple open economy model the authors predict that both goods and capital markets
integration spur poorer countries to run larger current account deﬁcits. The experience
of Greece and Portugal in the last decade is then taken as indirect evidence of increased
integration among EMU members.
Pagano and von Thadden (2004) focus on changes in the markets for euro area sovereign
and private bonds in the wake of monetary union. The elimination of exchange rate risk
has eliminated the major source of ﬁnancial markets segmentation and ushered in greater
comparability, competition and liquidity of secondary markets. The authors note that
the adoption of a single currency and the elimination of currency risk is not suﬃcient to
integrate markets if institutional, legal and ﬁscal barriers persist. In this respect, the most
relevant eﬀect of EMU has been the sequence of policy actions aimed at removing almost
all remaining obstacles and therefore facilitate capital markets integration. Pressure to
achieve benchmark status for their sovereign bonds spurred governments to adopt early
redenomination strategies; this in turn called for reconventioning agreements whereby
issuing practices, formats, sizes and the like were homogenized in a cooperative fashion.
The long wave of this process went beyond the boundaries of the euro area: the UK as
well has issued euro-denominated bonds.
Additional indirect evidence on European capital market integration is provided by
those studies that investigate the nature and the determinants of remaining diﬀerentials
between government bond yields. These tend to ﬁnd little role for local factors and
therefore dismiss explanations based on liquidity risk and on residual market segmentation
(Codogno et al., 2003; Pagano and von Thadden, 2004).
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The relation between ﬁnancial integration and business cycle synchronization is less clear-
cut. Advocates of the specialization paradigm (Krugman, 1993) claim that ﬁnancial inte-
gration fosters specialization and therefore makes countries less synchronized. This piece
of theory has recently been tested by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001, 2003): the ﬁrst article
shows that regions with a more specialized production structure exhibit less correlated
output ﬂuctuations, the second establishes a link between capital market integration and
higher specialization in production. Together, the two pieces provide empirical support for
the hypothesis that ﬁnancial integration is conducive to less synchronized business cycles.
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. conclude that according to this evidence, ﬁnancial integration would
dampen the eﬀect of lower trade barriers on the symmetry of ﬂuctuations and reduce the
ex post optimality of a currency area.
These ﬁndings clash with the conclusions reached by Rose and Engel (2002) and Dar-
vas and Szap´ ary (2004) and reviewed in section II above. Using a simultaneous equation
framework that accounts for the interactions between trade, ﬁnance, industrial specializa-
tion and output co-movements, Imbs (2004) oﬀers a possible reconciliation of these results
by noting that ﬁnancially integrated economies are more synchronized despite the fact
that they are also more specialized.
The interaction between the functioning of ﬁnancial markets and sectoral growth dy-
namics is explicitly addressed in Rajan and Zingales (1998), where the authors present
robust evidence that industrial sectors relatively more in need of external ﬁnance develop
faster in countries with more eﬃcient capital markets. Claessens and Laeven (2005) ex-
ploit a similar methodology to ﬁnd that external ﬁnancially dependent sectors grow faster
in environments characterized by more competition in the banking sector. This is because
they beneﬁt proportionally more from the reduction in the costs of funds spurred by com-
petition. Under the maintained hypothesis that currency unions (and EMU in particular)
foster competition in the ﬁnancial sector and may facilitate the penetration of intermedi-
aries in foreign markets that have adopted the same legal tender, these ﬁndings provide
indirect evidence to sustain the idea that more integrated economies tend to specialize in
the same (ﬁnancial dependent and possibly risky) sectors.
Large eﬀort has been devoted in the last ten years or so to asses the impact of European
12integration on the industrial structure of member countries. Most of these empirical
contributions however predate EMU and focus on the integration of real, rather than
ﬁnancial, markets. Hence, one has to be cautious when applying their ﬁndings to the case
of monetary uniﬁcation, as in principle capital market integration may entail very diﬀerent
adjustment paths.
This being said, it is worth noting that no well-deﬁned implications emerge from the
data, as results appear to be sensitive to the level of regional disaggregation (Martin, 2001)
and to the variable chosen to measure sectoral activity. For instance, Br¨ ulhart (2001)
reports that the large and growing share of intra-industry trade found in export data
testiﬁes to sectoral dispersion and international similarity among the underlying economic
structures; production data on the contrary point to increased geographical concentration,
while sectoral employment reports more specialization and less similarity.
In a subsequent work Br¨ ulhart and Traeger (2005) ﬁnd little support for the hypothesis
that strong sectoral reallocation trends across economic activities have taken place between
1975 and 2000, while geographic concentration has been stronger after the introduction of
the Single Market Act in 1986. However, non homogeneous patterns continue to emerge:
data on the service sector in fact shows increased between countries concentration, whilst
manufacturing has experienced within country agglomeration.
Finally, Midelfart et al. (2003) address explicitly the role of EMU and conclude that
while monetary uniﬁcation generates increased specialization, the size and relevance of
industry speciﬁc shock is not such as to impose additional burden on macroeconomic
management and therefore does not raise the cost of monetary policy. One can read this
last result as conﬁrming the ﬁndings on the relation between sectoral specialization and
output co-movements: as outlined in section II most empirical studies do not report any
signiﬁcant impact of industrial structures on business cycle correlation.
III Methodology and data
The paper pursues two diﬀerent methodologies in order to identify the role of ﬁnancial
integration in determining output correlation.
First, we use single equation estimation to gauge the eﬀects of trade, ﬁnance, spe-
13cialization and similarity of industrial structure on GDP co-movements. Following Otto
et al. (2001) we move from simple to complex and start from a bivariate speciﬁcation
where business cycle synchronization is regressed on each of the explanatory variable in
turn. This approach limits colinearity problems but evidently pays a high price in term of
explanatory power and results give only a coarse representation of the relation of interest.
Multivariate regressions are then presented and discussed, from which it is possible to
have a more complete picture.
The second step exploits the simultaneous equation approach suggested by Imbs (2004),
which grants us the possibility of more adequately investigating the complex system of
interactions among trade, ﬁnance, specialization and synchronization. In its original spec-
iﬁcation the system of simultaneous equation reads as follow:
ρ = α0 + α1F + α2T + α3S (1)
F = β0 + β1XF (2)
T = γ0 + γ1S + γ2XT (3)
S = δ0 + δ1F + δ2T + δ3XS (4)
where ρ measures output correlation, F ﬁnancial integration, T bilateral trade ﬂows, S
sectoral similarity and X∗ are additional controls needed to achieve identiﬁcation.
Whilst Imbs (2004) uses a pure cross-sectional dataset, we adopt a panel approach
and investigate the behavior of 190 country pairs5 over the period 1991–2002. To have a
meaningful measure of GDP correlation the 12 years have been divided into 3 subperiods of
4 years each, and quarterly real GDP (taken from the OECD Main Economic Indicators)
used to compute synchronization.
Three measures of business cycles synchronization are employed: a) the correlation
between GDP series ﬁltered via a band-pass ﬁlter ` a la Baxter and King (1999); b) the
correlation between fourth-lag log-diﬀerences; c) a measure based on the innovations from
an AR(2) process as used in Alesina et al. (2002). In the regression analysis the ﬁrst two
indicators are further transformed to account for the fact that sample correlations must
lie between -1 and 1 (see Appendix A for details).
Trade data come the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and bilateral trade intensity is





To measure ﬁnancial integration we use price-based indicators, as opposed to Imbs
(2004) who opts for quantity-based measures. Besides data availability considerations,
our decision is determined by the conclusions of some recent studies. Adam et al. (2002)
suggest that indicators based on price data dominate those based on quantities in terms of
accuracy and moreover grant a clear-cut interpretation; Goldberg et al. (2003) state that
real interest rate equalization is the broadest and most theoretically appealing measure
of ﬁnancial integration, as it refers to the law of one price. Baele et al. (2004) agree
with such a claim, but advocate the use of nominal rather than real yields, motivating
the choice by noting that otherwise one conducts a joint test of ﬁnancial integration and
purchasing power parity. In addition, local factors (like inﬂation) should not be relevant
in integrated markets unless inﬂation is related to credit risk. These considerations lead
us to use nominal interest rates as well.
We deﬁne ﬁnancial integration as Euclidean distance between the spread among long-




2 + (siri − sirj)
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where lir and sir are the long- and short-term interest rate, while i and j label diﬀerent
countries. This measure is based on the recognition that ﬁnancial integration is a multi-
faceted phenomenon so that focusing on a single aspect (a single market segment) may
produce a distorted picture. More speciﬁcally, diﬀerent risk premia entails the presence of
persistent spreads among government bond yields (and all long-term rates) also in pres-
ence of perfectly integrated capital markets: indeed, spreads may signal well-functioning
ﬁnancial markets that are able to discriminate among diﬀerent issuers. On the other hand,
as the money market is more readily aﬀected by the institutional changes brought about
by EMU, short-term rates run the risk of presenting too strong an eﬀect of monetary
integration. This is because the emergence of a single reference rate for reﬁnancing opera-
tions (that established by the ECB) generates a sort of ‘mechanical convergence’ in those
market segments that are more heavily dependent on it. Using a combination of interest
15rates instead of a single one helps to limit the aforementioned eﬀects and should provide
us with a cleaner picture of capital market integration.
Similarity and specialization are computed from employment data for 27 sectors taken
from the OECD STAN database. Sectoral similarity is measured as the sum over all
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where k represents sectors. In addition, we build a measure for specialization given by the
pairwise product of the Herﬁndahl indexes for the two economies.
Estimation of the system is performed using the error component 2SLS (EC2SLS)
procedure suggested by Baltagi (2001). Despite the fact that 2SLS is a limited information
method and therefore pays a price in terms of eﬃciency, in a Monte Carlo study Baltagi
(1984) shows that the eﬃciency gain associated with EC3SLS is not large enough to
justify the computational eﬀort, while using standard 3SLS estimator —which exploits all
the available information, but disregards the panel structure of the data— yields inferior
results.
IV Empirical evidence
Table 1 presents the correlation among relevant variables (boldface indicates signiﬁcance
at 10% level). The synchronization measure is that obtained using the band-pass ﬁlter.
The signs of the coeﬃcients supports our maintained hypotheses (we are measuring lack of
ﬁnancial integration and structural similarity): there is a positive relation between trade
and synchronization and between trade and ﬁnancial integration. More important, the
latter is positively related to GDP correlation though it enhances specialization. However,
ﬁnance-induced specialization seems to occur in similar sectors as testiﬁed by the positive
correlation between capital market integration and similarity.
[Table 1 about here.]
Table 2 displays summary statistics. Panel (a) distinguishes among observations for
which the currency union dummy equals 1 (i.e. EMU members in period 3, 1999–2002)
16and the rest of the sample. What emerges is that EMU members are on average more
synchronized, experience larger trade ﬂows and have smaller interest rate spreads. With
respect to this last point, it is interesting to note that not only is the interest rate spread
lower on average, but there is also much less variability (standard deviation drops from
2.55 to 0.61). The behavior of specialization and structural similarity is less clear-cut:
euro area countries seem to be slightly more similar and less specialized.
One may argue that the diﬀerent behavior of the two subsamples is the eﬀect of a
common worldwide trend rather than the eﬀect of EMU. Therefore panel (b) presents
again the distinction between members and non members of a currency union, but limits
the analysis to the period 1999–2002. The resulting picture is qualitatively very similar
to the previous one: interestingly the case for a ‘euro eﬀect’ seems even stronger. Output
synchronization is the only variable for which the distinction between members and non
members of a currency union is smaller than in panel a. On the contrary, for trade, ﬁnance,
sectoral similarity and specialization the diﬀerence grows larger. These results may be
expected for trade and ﬁnance, as monetary unions are likely to involve large trading
partners and/or economic systems that are already well integrated, while as concerns
similarity and specialization, they witness against both the specialization hypothesis and
the evidence proposed by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001). In fact, EMU member countries
display a markedly more similar economic structure and also less specialization: all this
lends credit to the endogeneity hypothesis.
[Table 2 about here.]
Single equation estimation
Table 3 presents results for a set of bivariate regressions that investigate the impact of
trade and ﬁnancial integration, structural similarity and specialization on the correlation
of business cycles. In this ﬁrst stage we introduce explanatory variables separately. Three
diﬀerent speciﬁcations are run for each control: ﬁrst a simple bivariate regression, which
is then augmented with a currency union dummy and, ﬁnally, with a time trend. Results
from bare bones bivariate regressions (columns (1), (4), (7) and (10)) conﬁrm our pri-
ors. Real and ﬁnancial integration have a positive impact on output correlation as does
similarity of industrial structures; on the contrary, more specialized countries tend to be
17less synchronized. This evidence supports the idea that capital market integration fosters
cycles correlation, contrary to what is customarily assumed.
[Table 3 about here.]
In columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) a currency union dummy is added to the regression.
While the estimated coeﬃcients of the main variables are robust to this change, the be-
havior of the currency union dummy is rather volatile: negative and not signiﬁcant in the
case of ﬁnance, it turns positive and signiﬁcant in the other cases, moving to rather large
numbers. This conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004), i.e. that currency
unions cannot be included among the robust determinants of business cycle correlation.
This last consideration is further corroborated when, to better evaluate the eﬀect of
EMU, a time trend is included (columns (3), (6), (9) and (12): the coeﬃcient of the time
trend is not shown). The coeﬃcient of the currency union dummy looses signiﬁcance in all
instances, and becomes not statistically diﬀerent from zero in the trade regression (column
(3)). Estimated coeﬃcients of other controls do not change6.
[Table 4 about here.]
Before moving to multivariate analysis, let us emphasize that the lack of a direct
relation between monetary integration and business cycle correlation does not work against
our maintained hypothesis. The endogeneity argument in fact does not state that by
joining a currency union a country will become more synchronized with its fellow countries,
but rather that the likely increase in trade and ﬁnancial integration brought about by the
use of a single currency will have an eﬀect also on output correlation. It is indeed this
indirect eﬀect that makes OCA endogenous.
The speciﬁcation for multivariate regression analysis is simple juxtaposition of all pos-
sible determinants of business cycle correlation encountered so far:
(5) synchrijt = α0+α1tradeijt+α2financeijt+α3specijt+α4structijt+α5EMUijt+εijt .
Once again we have used diﬀerent speciﬁcations augmenting the basic regression equa-
tion with an EMU dummy, time dummies and a time trend. Results are summarized in
Table 4: they largely conﬁrm what bivariate regressions suggest: once again the currency
18union indicator is not robust to changes in the structure of the estimated equation, which
implies that there is not a clear, direct link between the choice to use a single currency
and output correlation. Its negative sign appears to conﬁrm Farina and Tamborini’s hy-
pothesis, according to which in presence of structural asymmetries monetary policy may
have ‘perverse eﬀects’ and lead to increased output dispersion.
Trade, ﬁnance and structural similarity have a positive impact on business cycle syn-
chronization. The specialization measure (the pairwise product of the Herﬁndahl index)
has the expected negative sign but is not signiﬁcant at 5%. These conclusions are robust
to the inclusion of period dummies and of a time trend (columns (3) and (4)).
[Table 5 about here.]
Robustness is tested using alternative measures for cycles synchronization and ﬁnancial
integration, the two variables on which our attention is concentrated. Estimation results
in Table 5 tell that the what has been claimed so far does not hinge upon a particular
way to measure GDP linkages. Columns (1) to (4) are derived using bilateral correlations
between the fourth-diﬀerences of the log of real GDP and results are almost identical to
those in Table 4. Even when we choose a radically diﬀerent measure, as it is the one
proposed by Alesina et al. (2002) and used in columns (5)–(8), qualitative conclusions do
not change7. If possible, these results are even more convincing, as all coeﬃcients —apart
from the EMU dummy— are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, have the expected sign and
therefore conﬁrm our priors and agree with most recent literature.
In Table 6 we measure ﬁnancial integration in a diﬀerent way, starting from government
bond yields and bank lending rates (the prime rate collected by Datastream). This index
has appeal because the two rates spans two separate (‘orthogonal’) markets and therefore
give a more complete picture of capital market integration. As before, both trade and
ﬁnancial integration appear to exert a positive inﬂuence on output correlation. In Table
6 however sectoral similarity and specialization loose signiﬁcance although they display
the correct sign: the behavior of the currency union dummy continues not to be robust
to diﬀerent speciﬁcations. As the number of available observation is signiﬁcantly reduced
when using F2, estimates are less precise: it is nevertheless remarkable that the overall
picture is resilient to these perturbations.
19In columns (5)–(8) of Table 6 we revert to the original measure of ﬁnancial integration
F1, and use its own lag to account for potential endogeneity8. Estimation results conﬁrm
the robust eﬀects of trade and ﬁnance, while structural variables such as sectoral similarity
and specialization loose signiﬁcance.
[Table 6 about here.]
At this point we can already summarize a ﬁrst set of results. Our analysis points
toward a robust eﬀect of capital market integration on output correlation; this adds to
the already established channel working through trade, whose existence and relevance is
conﬁrmed here as well. The role of structural similarity and specialization is less clear-
cut, probably because these are slow-moving structural factors whose impact is diﬃcult to
distinguish at business cycle frequencies. Still, the intuition that more similar economies
are hit by symmetric shocks and therefore display more correlated cycles, while economic
systems that are very specialized tend to move less together ﬁnds some support. Regression
results do not highlight any robust direct ‘euro eﬀect’. Consistently with what is reported
by Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004) the coeﬃcients of the currency union dummy is not
robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and even when signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, it changes
sign and magnitude.
System estimation
To better address the role of EMU we turn now to the simultaneous equation framework
ﬁrst proposed by Imbs (2004), and capable of accounting for the interactions between our
key variables. Table 7 display results of EC2SLS estimation of the original system as
speciﬁed in equations (1)–(4) above. A few minor modiﬁcation are needed to comply with
the panel structure of our dataset and to match the priors of the paper: we introduce
an EMU dummy in all the equations and instrument finance using its own lags (the
institutional variables used by Imbs (2004) are time invariant).
[Table 7 about here.]
Results are similar to those reported in the original paper (Imbs, 2004, Table 4): in
particular, trade and ﬁnancial integration both aﬀect output correlation positively, as does
20a similar industrial structure (though its coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant). This in turn implies
larger trade linkages and testiﬁes to the importance of inter-industry trade. The main
diﬀerence with Imbs’s results lies in the sign (and signiﬁcance) of the finance coeﬃcient
in column (3): we ﬁnd no evidence for ﬁnance-induced specialization in diﬀerent sectors.
On the contrary, there seems to be a positive link between capital markets integration and
similarity of industrial structures.
This last result oﬀers support for the idea that greater/better access to international
ﬁnancial markets, by oﬀering a wider range of risk-sharing instruments, allows countries
to undertake similar patterns of specialization in risky and therefore more ﬁnancially
demanding activities.
To better investigate this link, we modify slightly the structure of the system and ex-
plicitly distinguish specialization and structural similarity. Both Imbs (2004) and the vast
majority of studies that deal with specialization patterns in Europe tend to assume (more
or less implicitly) that specialization necessarily implies less similar economic structure.
To challenge this belief we adopt separate measures for specialization and structural sim-
ilarity as we have already done in the context of multivariate, single equation estimation.
Equation (5) thus becomes the ﬁrst line in our modiﬁed system, where subscripts have
been omitted for the sake of simplicity:
synchr = α0 + α1trade + α2finance + α3spec + α4struct + α5EMU + ε1 (6)
trade = β0 + β1finance + β2spec + β3struct + β4EMU + X2 + ε2 (7)
finance = γ0 + γ1trade + γ2EMU + X3 + ε3 (8)
spec = δ0 + δ1trade + δ2finance + δ3EMU + X4 + ε4 (9)
struct = φ0 + φ1finance + φ2spec + φ3EMU + ε5 . (10)
Equation (7) postulates that trade is explained by ﬁnance (trade credit oﬀers a sim-
ple justiﬁcation for this), specialization and sectoral similarity, which command inter-
and intra-industry trade respectively. X2 is a set of exogenous determinants containing
gravity variables (GDP, distance, common language and number of landlocked countries
in the pair: these data are taken from Andrew Rose’s website), which are also used as
instruments when trade appears on the right hand side of an equation. Financial inte-
gration depends on trade linkages (equation (8)): the rationale behind this idea is the
21model presented in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000), where the authors show how reasonable
frictions in goods markets may explain some of the most relevant puzzles in the functioning
of international capital markets. The predetermined variables X3 are finance own lags.
Equation (9) replicates Imbs (2004)’s speciﬁcation and states that sectoral specialization
is driven by trade and ﬁnancial integration plus the pairwise product and ratio of GDP
per capita (the latter two controls are subsumed by X4). The last equation establishes a
link between specialization and similarity of industrial structures and therefore formalizes
the hypothesis that specialization may occur in similar sectors.
[Table 8 about here.]
Table 8 reports results for equation by equation EC2SLS that exploits the Baltagi and
Chang (2000) consistent estimator of the variance components. Each column of the table
represents one equation of the system, whilst relevant controls are on rows (exogenous
determinants are not reported).
The diﬀerence between columns (1)–(5) and (6)–(10) lies in the sectoral data used to
compute specialization and structural similarity measures: ﬁrst we use the employment
data employed so far in single equation estimation, then we turn to sectoral stock market
capitalization taken from Datastream9.
Column (1) conﬁrms results of multivariate regression analysis (tables 4–6 above) and
therefore does not require a detailed discussion: let us note that the coeﬃcient of struc-
tural similarity looses signiﬁcance but keeps the expected sign (low values of struct are
associated with higher correlation), while specialization is again negative but not signif-
icant. The EMU dummy is negative, rather large and signiﬁcant: we interpret this as
conﬁrming the existence of ‘perverse eﬀects’ of the common monetary policy ` a la Farina
and Tamborini (2004).
Estimation of equation (7) yields the results reported in column (2): the currency
union dummy as well as gravity variables (not shown) have the expected sign; both sectoral
specialization and structural diversity have a negative sign, which suggests the prevalence
of intra-industry over inter-industry trade. These estimated coeﬃcients in fact tell us that
more specialized countries tend to trade less, while —on the contrary— economies with
a similar industrial structure enjoy large commercial ﬂows. Financial integration appears
22not to play a relevant role in determining trade linkages, but this is little wonder as the
latter usually predate the former.
Column (3) conﬁrms our intuition and suggests both that EMU has had a relevant
impact on ﬁnancial integration inside the euro area and that trade relations facilitate
capital markets harmonization10.
Results for equation (9) yields contrasting signals: while in fact there is no sign of
trade induced specialization —on the contrary deeper commercial links are associated
with lower values for the product of Herﬁndahl indexes— ﬁnancial integration seems to
enhance specialization, as documented in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003).
Equation (10) should tell us whether the specialization triggered by international cap-
ital market integration occurs in similar (risky) sectors or results in countries having less
similar industrial structures. Estimates in column (5) seem to support the idea that coun-
tries specialize in similar sectors: in fact, more specialization is associated with lower
structural diversity. Yet, the very low value of the R2 (very low even for the standards of
panel regression models) suggests caution when interpreting these results and renders the
use of alternative sectoral data particularly important.
When we turn to data on sectoral stock market capitalization there are a few points
to note. On one hand this dataset oﬀers a wider coverage (20 countries instead of the 18
covered by OECD employment data), fewer missing observations and a ﬁner classiﬁcation
that divides the economy in a larger number of sectors. On the other, stock market
capitalization is traditionally skewed toward sectors dominated by higher returns of scale
and hence large ﬁrms; moreover, the FTSE Global Classiﬁcation System employed by
Datastream gives a rather high weight to service-based sectors whose activities entails
a (more or less large) nontradable component. This being said, let us turn now to the
estimation results that are summarized in columns (6)–(10) of Table 8.
Estimated coeﬃcients for equation (6) are basically unchanged: the EMU dummy
retains its negative sign, though its value is much lower now and it is not signiﬁcant;
structural similarity is still negative and not signiﬁcant, whilst the measure of specializa-
tion displays a positive yet not signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (p-value 0.148).
We observe some relevant changes in column (2): ﬁrst the coeﬃcient of ﬁnancial inte-
gration becomes signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and therefore establishes a link between
23this variable and trade ﬂows; second, structural similarity changes sign and turns positive,
suggesting that more diverse economic systems tend to have closer commercial contacts.
This reverses our previous result and can be explained by Ricardian trade theory and
comparative advantages. Column (8) is identical to column (3) as sectoral variables are
not concerned.
Next we move to equation (9): any sign of ﬁnance induced specialization disappears
as the coeﬃcient of ﬁnancial integration looses signiﬁcance (and even changes sign). This
radical change in the behavior of variables connected with the structure of the economy is
conﬁrmed in column (10). Here specialization generates diversity in industrial structures
and therefore conﬁrms the traditional eﬀect postulated by the literature. Interestingly
though, this is associated with a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the EMU dummy,
which suggests that euro area countries enjoy a more similar economic structure since
1999.
To summarize what we have done so far, we can conclude that results from the simul-
taneous equation approach conﬁrm the existence of an endogenous eﬀect linking the use of
a single currency with the synchronization of business cycles and working through capital
market integration. This indirect eﬀect is given by [γ2 · α2] and makes the pair with the
trade channel identiﬁed by Frankel and Rose (1998), which amounts to [β4 · α1]11. Our
estimates implies that, starting from the mean values for the EMU group before 1999,
reducing F1 by 50% results in an increase in output correlation of 0.10.
We have been less successful in determining the relation between ﬁnancial integration
and sectoral dynamics: data and empirical analysis in fact do not oﬀer a clear-cut picture
of the relation between the adoption of a single currency, capital market integration and
sectoral specialization patterns. It is precisely to this issue that we turn next.
V Financial integration and sectoral growth
In this section we investigate whether the increased ﬁnancial integration spurred by the
launch of the euro has had any impact on the growth rate of R&D intense sectors. This
kind of analysis has been pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to show that ﬁnancial
development nurtures growth of sectors that rely more heavily on external ﬁnance. Re-
24cently the same approach been exploited also to analyze the growth eﬀect of competition
and concentration in the banking sector (Claessens and Laeven, 2005). The maintained
hypothesis is that by reducing the cost of external ﬁnance and rising the overall quality
of the service, a more competitive banking sector allows ﬁnancially dependent industries
to grow faster.
These ﬁndings constitute indirect evidence in favor of Obstfeld’s (1994) hypothesis ac-
cording to which ﬁnancial integration stimulates growth by allowing countries to specialize
in risky, high-yielding activities. If all countries move in this direction we should witness a
change in their economic structure whereby they become simultaneously more specialized
and more similar. Intuitively we can identify risky activities with those where knowledge,
R&D and innovation play a particularly relevant role. Although the relation between
R&D intensity and ﬁnancial dependence is not immediate, one observes that according
to Rajan and Zingales (1998) the most ﬁnancially dependent manufacturing sectors are
drugs, plastic products and IT hardware, whilst at the other end of the spectrum one ﬁnds
tobacco, pottery and leather. Hence, some indirect evidence exists according to which, by
enhancing competition and integration in the ﬁnancial sector, monetary uniﬁcation may
facilitate the development of knowledge-based economic sectors.
To investigate the issue in some more detail we analyze the growth of 35 sectoral stock
market indices in 20 countries between 1991 and 2004. The original sectors are grouped
into 3 large groups according to the technological content of their production. The classi-
ﬁcation is drawn on the basis of the OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard
and divides sectors into knowledge-based services, high, medium-high, medium-low and
low technology industries. To have an homogeneous number of sectors in each group
we have aggregated the subgroups into three larger classes. Thus, the high-tech family
is made up of knowledge-based services and high technology industries and ranges from
telecommunication and computer services to ﬁnance, IT hardware and pharmaceuticals;
medium-tech combines medium-high and medium-low technology industries (from motor
vehicles and chemicals to machinery and metal products); low-tech is made of more tra-
ditional sectors like paper, textiles, household goods and food production12.
Table 9 reports the average growth rate of stock market capitalization for each of the
three sectoral groupings, relative to the total market value. In other words —to correct
25(at least partially) for the potential self-selection bias that would occur in presence of
a high-tech stock market bubble or, more generally, if market-based ﬁnancing tends to
favor risky industries and technologies (Allen and Gale, 1999)— the average growth rate
of each group is scaled by the growth of total market value. What we are looking for is
a particularly sparkling performance of high-tech sectors after the launch of the euro in
EMU member countries.
Although Table 9 presents only rough and crude evidence, some interesting patterns
emerge that somehow conﬁrms our intuition: in the last period under scrutiny, in fact,
knowledge-based sectors display a marked increase in stock market capitalization in the
euro area. The same period witnesses a marked decline in medium-tech activities and
almost no growth at all for traditional sectors. This pattern is very diﬀerent for the subset
of countries outside the euro area: there it is the medium-tech group to have the best
performance, while high-tech sectors do not grow much.
This kind of dynamics could be the result of a wider and longer trend and have nothing
to do with the single currency and ﬁnancial integration. To check this, we take a look at
average growth rates in previous periods. Either we concentrate on EMU members and
follow their behavior through time or we focus on the diﬀerence between the two groups in
each period, the picture does not change much and suggests that since 1999 EMU members
have enjoyed a period of unusual growth in high-tech industries.
[Table 9 about here.]
Simultaneity however does not necessarily imply causality. Therefore it is important
to revert to more formal analysis capable to convey more information on the actual rela-
tionship between the single currency and the growth of innovation-intense, risky sectors.
We adapt to the purpose the empirical approach originally used by Rajan and Zingales
(1998) to study the impact of ﬁnancial development on ﬁnancially dependent sectors. In
the present context, ﬁnancial dependence is substituted with a measure of R&D inten-
sity taken from Pagano and Schivardi (2003), while ﬁnancial integration replaces ﬁnancial
development. We end up with the following estimating equation:
(11) gwtkj = α0+α1SDk+α2CDj+α3sharekj+α4R&Dk·fin intj+α5R&Dk·EMUj+εkj
26The dependent variable is the average growth rate of stock market capitalization be-
tween December 1998 and December 2004 in sector k and country j; SDk and CDj are
industry and country dummies, sharekj represents the weight of each sector on total mar-
ket capitalization in 1999, R&Dk measures R&D expenditures on value added for each
sector (in the US), while EMUj takes value 1 if country j is a member of EMU. We
have constructed fin intj for each country as the average value of our bilateral index of
ﬁnancial integration (F1ij) with all the other 19 partners: in this way fin intj measures
the average ‘distance’ from interest rate parity with all countries in the sample.
One diﬃculty is represented by the necessity to match the sectoral classiﬁcation used
by Datastream (and based on the FTSE Global Classiﬁcation System) with the measures
of R&D intensity constructed by Pagano and Schivardi (2003) following the NACE sectoral
classiﬁcation and limited to manufacturing sectors. Our analysis is limited to the 11 sectors
for which there is an evident correspondence between the two classiﬁcation systems (see
Appendix B).
We are interested in the coeﬃcients of the two interaction terms: they tell whether
international ﬁnancial integration and EMU have facilitated the growth of high-tech sec-
tors. Regression results are displayed in columns (1) and (2) of Table 10, but are not very
encouraging. Estimated coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant and α4 has also the wrong sign.
Both the relatively small number of available observations and the diﬃculty to match R&D
measures with the FTSE sectoral classiﬁcation are possible explanations for the poor per-
formance of the regression. Results are even less signiﬁcant if we change the dependent
variable and use the average growth rate of sectoral shares, as we do in columns (3) and
(4).
[Table 10 about here.]
As a further check, we revert to the sectoral employment data that we have already
used to build similarity and specialization measures. As an indicator of sectoral R&D
intensity we opt now for the share of research personnel on total sectoral employment.
Results are reported in columns (5)–(8) of Table 10. Although still not signiﬁcant at the
5% level, the coeﬃcient of the interaction term between international ﬁnancial integration
and sectoral research intensity now displays the correct negative sign and its t statistic
27is reasonably large (p-values range between 0.07 and 0.06). On the contrary, the launch
of the euro seems not to have had any particular impact on the performance of high-tech
sectors. Results are almost invariant to the choice of the dependent variable: either we use
the average growth rate of sectoral employment as in columns (5) and (6), or the growth of
sectoral employment shares, estimated coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance levels are unchanged.
This analysis is not strongly supportive to the view that EMU, by enhancing inter-
national ﬁnancial integration, facilitates the growth of risky and high yielding economic
sectors and/or leads to a common specialization pattern within the euro area. Yet there
are some signals that point in this direction, which ought to be better investigated and
keep the door open for future fruitful research on the issue.
VI Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the relation between ﬁnancial integration and output
correlation in the context of OCA theory. We ﬁnd robust and consistent evidence that
monetary integration enhances capital market integration, which in turn feeds back into
the system and results in closer business cycles synchronization. This mechanism adds to
the trade channel highlighted by Frankel and Rose (1998), lends credit to the hypothesis
that countries are better candidates to join a monetary union ex post rather than ex ante
and represents the main contribution of the paper.
The implication of this research for European policy making are important and far
reaching. The debate on the pros and cons of EMU participation, especially in opt-out
countries and new EU members, obviously beneﬁts from a wider and deeper understand-
ing of the forces set in motion by the inception of the monetary union. Moreover, the
emphasis placed by European institutions on the harmonization and integration of goods
and capital markets seems well placed. In fact, through its eﬀects on the co-movement of
macroeconomic variables, closer integration is not only beneﬁcial to consumers, but may
also facilitate the task of euro area policymakers.
More work is needed to fully understand the determinants of the relation between in-
ternational ﬁnancial integration and GDP correlation. The last part of our work explores
one possible cause, namely the hypothesis that capital markets integration triggers spe-
28cialization in similar R&D intense, risky sectors. While some signals emerge that point
in that direction, empirical evidence is far from conclusive and does not allow us to draw
strong inference on the issue.
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29Appendix A
Measures of output synchronization based on bilateral correlation are transformed before
entering the regression analysis. This is done to account for the fact that sample corre-
lations must lie between -1 and 1, while independent variables span the whole real line.
This is likely to have adverse eﬀects in the estimation of a model of the form
(A1) ρ = αlog(x) + ε.
This problem is ﬁrst recognized by Otto et al. (2001), which —to our knowledge— remains
the only work to tackle the issue.
Following the transformation proposed there, the dependent variable becomes






˜ ρ now spans the whole real line and the transformed model is
(A3) ˜ ρ = αlog(x) + ε .
As a result of the transformation, the interpretation of the coeﬃcients changes slightly:
while in fact equation (A3) implies that a 100% increase in x results in a change in ˜ ρ equal
to [αlog(2)], the impact on ρ has a slightly more complex formulation.
Given our interest on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial integration and the fact that F1ijt measures
distance from the law of one price, we analyze the case in which the explanatory variable
x drops from x1 to x2 = x1/2. Combining equations (A2) and (A3) and abstracting from
the error term we can write:
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FTSE Classiﬁcation NACE Classiﬁcation
Aerospace and Defence high-tech
Banks high-tech




Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology high-tech
Software and Computer Services high-tech
Speciality and Other Finance high-tech
Telecommunication Services high-tech
Automobiles and Parts medium-tech Motor vehicles
Chemicals medium-tech Chemicals
Diversiﬁed Industrials medium-tech
Electronic and Electrical Equipment medium-tech Electrical Machinery
Engineering and Machinery medium-tech Machinery and Comp.
Mining medium-tech
Oil and Gas medium-tech
Steel and Other Metals medium-tech Basic Metals
Transport medium-tech
Beverages low-tech
Construction and Building Materials low-tech Wood
Food and Drug Retailers low-tech
Food Producers and Processors low-tech Food & Bever.
Forestry and Paper low-tech Paper
General Retailers low-tech
Health low-tech
Household Goods and Textiles low-tech Textile
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35Notes
1Unless it generates persistent regional disparities. This case is considered in section I.
2A single central bank in charge of monetary policy coupled with national ﬁscal authorities that face
binding deﬁcit ceilings.
3While in principle we may all agree that structural and stabilization policies should not compete for
the same source of funds, this distinction is not so clear in reality. In the recent debate about the ‘reform’
of the Stability and Growth Pact for instance, Germany has obtained agreement to exclude expenditures
devoted to the catching up of Eastern L¨ andern from the computation of the 3% threshold.
4Before that date, while there is a clear relation between economic integration and output synchroniza-
tion, colinearity prevents the identiﬁcation of the separate contributions of trade and FDI.
5Obtained from the following 20 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
6When the time trend is substituted by period dummies estimated coeﬃcients of controls do not display
any signiﬁcant change, while the EMU dummy becomes not signiﬁcant in all regressions. These results are
not reported.
7That is an index of distance between the innovations from an AR(2) process ﬁtted to real GDP series:
it measures lack of co-movement and therefore implies that the sign of coeﬃcient must change with respect
to the previous cases.
8Imbs (2004) —who uses quantity-based measures of ﬁnancial integration— suggests that ﬁnancial ﬂows
may be larger between less synchronized markets as this would allow for better risk sharing. Though this
source of endogeneity works against our maintained hypothesis and although it does not have an immediate
translation to the case of price-based measures, we prefer not to leave the question unaddressed.
9These data are described in more details in section V.
10EC2SLS is ill suited to deal with the presence of lagged dependent variables among the regressors
in equation (8). The appropriate econometric machinery is a dynamic panel setup enabling one to deal
with both endogenous controls and lagged dependent variables (Bond, 2002). Luckily enough, the two
methodologies yield very similar results; therefore, for the sake of simplicity, Table 4 reports only EC2SLS
estimates, whilst the other results are available upon request.
11The overall EMU eﬀect would be given by α5 + γ2 · α2 + β4 · α1 + δ3 · α3 + φ2 · α4 .
12The full list of sectors and their aﬃliation to diﬀerent technological groups is reported in Appendix B.
Six sectors are excluded from the analysis as they do not ﬁnd an easy collocation in any of the technology
group.
36Table 1: Pairwise correlation matrix
synchr trade ﬁnance struct spec
synchr 1.000
trade 0.241 1.000
ﬁnance -0.244 -0.262 1.000
struct -0.273 -0.389 0.298 1.000
spec -0.187 -0.175 0.140 0.047 1.000
Boldface indicates signiﬁcance at 10%
Table 2: Summary statistics
Subsample Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs
panel (a): 1991–2002
CU=0 syncr 0.2844 0.5305 -0.9192 0.9934 525
trade 0.0047 0.0072 0.0000 0.0685 525
ﬁnance 3.3412 2.5494 0.1686 15.3692 506
struct 33.7565 9.7029 13.4070 60.2700 335
spec 682440 92374 454270 906230 335
CU=1 syncr 0.6448 0.2541 0.1028 0.9629 45
trade 0.0112 0.0123 0.0007 0.0606 45
ﬁnance 0.4157 0.6107 0.0213 1.6987 45
struct 33.5542 9.4856 12.0050 53.8110 45
spec 615232 65001 525850 794230 45
panel (b): 1999–2002
CU=0 syncr 0.4512 0.4213 -0.6207 0.9934 145
trade 0.0030 0.0058 0.0000 0.0384 145
ﬁnance 2.3164 1.5853 0.3512 8.0958 145
struct 34.1257 10.5318 14.6580 58.4210 91
spec 720809 72392 592570 892240 91
CU=1 syncr 0.6448 0.2541 0.1028 0.9629 45
trade 0.0112 0.0123 0.0007 0.0606 45
ﬁnance 0.4157 0.6107 0.0213 1.6987 45
struct 33.5542 9.4856 12.0050 53.8110 45
spec 615232 65001 525850 794230 45
37Table 3: Bivariate regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
trade 0.246 0.228 0.246
(6.46)** (5.94)** (6.24)**
ﬁnance -0.362 -0.372 -0.380
(6.51)** (4.97)** (4.91)**
spec -1.828 -1.292 -1.757
(3.25)** (2.27)* (3.00)**
struct -1.336 -1.328 -1.350
(5.16)** (5.26)** (5.38)**
EMU 0.680 0.483 -0.062 -0.053 1.054 0.786 0.966 0.601
(2.88)** (1.88) (0.20) (0.17) (5.00)** (3.40)** (4.36)** (2.43)*
Time trend No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 570 570 570 551 551 551 380 380 380 380 380 380
Groups 190 190 190 190 190 190 153 153 153 153 153 153
R
2 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.04 0.08 0.10
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Constant not reported
Time trend not reported in columns (3), (6), (9) and (12)
3
8Table 4: Multivariate regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
trade 0.170 0.174 0.272 0.189
(2.93)** (3.00)** (4.74)** (3.24)**
ﬁnance -0.385 -0.430 -0.281 -0.372
(6.30)** (5.22)** (3.42)** (4.33)**
spec -0.504 -0.526 -0.977 -0.815
(0.95) (0.99) (1.86) (1.50)
struct -0.615 -0.570 -0.411 -0.611
(2.41)* (2.18)* (1.63) (2.35)*
EMU -0.234 -0.755 -0.366
(0.81) (2.69)** (1.25)
Time dummies No No Yes No
Time trend No No No Yes
Observations 380 380 380 380
Groups 153 153 153 153
R
2 0.22 0.23 0.33 0.24
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Constant not reported
Period dummies not reported in column (3)
Time trend not reported in column (4)
Table 5: Robustness: alternative synchronization measures
synchr based on 4
th lags diﬀerence synchr based on AR(2) process
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
trade 0.149 0.155 0.232 0.167 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(3.27)** (3.42)** (5.06)** (3.66)** (2.39)* (2.57)* (2.61)** (3.69)**
ﬁnance -0.324 -0.373 -0.259 -0.325 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(7.08)** (5.95)** (4.08)** (4.95)** (5.03)** (4.69)** (2.56)* (2.13)*
spec 0.442 0.422 0.088 0.183 -0.015 -0.015 -0.010 -0.009
(1.06) (1.02) (0.21) (0.43) (5.25)** (5.22)** (3.50)** (3.36)**
struct -0.492 -0.436 -0.322 -0.467 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003
(2.44)* (2.14)* (1.60) (2.29)* (2.10)* (1.70) (2.61)** (2.00)*
EMU -0.246 -0.611 -0.339 0.002 0.002 0.004
(1.13) (2.86)** (1.54) (1.59) (1.83) (2.82)**
Time dummies No No Yes No No No Yes No
Time trend No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380
Groups 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
R
2 0.24 0.25 0.33 0.26 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Constant not reported
Period dummies not reported in columns (3) and (6)
Time trend not reported in columns (4) and (8)
39Table 6: Robustness: alternative ﬁnancial integration measures
finance = F2
† finance = lagged F1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
trade 0.284 0.240 0.335 0.294 0.232 0.203 0.306 0.225
(3.50)** (2.91)** (4.29)** (3.72)** (3.90)** (3.37)** (5.33)** (3.74)**
ﬁnance -0.448 -0.434 -0.217 -0.259 -0.354 -0.318 -0.229 -0.239
(3.46)** (3.38)** (1.74) (2.04)* (3.87)** (3.47)** (2.57)* (2.51)*
struct 0.215 0.027 -0.291 -0.357 -0.226 -0.331 -0.222 -0.397
(0.50) (0.06) (0.71) (0.85) (0.81) (1.19) (0.85) (1.43)
spec -0.500 -0.261 -1.050 -0.987 -1.011 -0.795 -1.316 -1.082
(0.67) (0.35) (1.49) (1.37) (1.86) (1.46) (2.56)* (1.97)*
EMU 0.695 -0.253 0.034 0.581 -0.292 0.278
(2.35)* (0.80) (0.11) (2.68)** (1.22) (1.15)
Time dummies No No Yes No No No Yes No
Time trend No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 205 205 205 205 363 363 363 363
Groups 103 103 103 103 152 152 152 152
R
2 0.17 0.20 0.32 0.28 0.17 0.18 0.30 0.20
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Constant not reported




2 + (bi − bj)
2, where g is government bond yield and b is bank lending rate









EMU -0.82 0.074 0.186
(2.06)* (1.13) (3.20)**
Observations 363 380 363
Groups 152 153 152
R
2 0.18 0.76 0.25
Equation by equation EC2SLS
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Constant not reported
Gravity variables not reported
40Table 8: Simultaneous equations: instrumental variable (EC2SLS) estimation
Sectoral employment Sectoral market value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
synchr trade ﬁnance spec struct synchr trade ﬁnance spec struct
trade 0.187 -0.046 -0.037 0.178 -0.046 -0.090
(3.08)** (2.14)* (4.53)** (4.35)** (2.14)* (2.35)*
ﬁnance -0.689 0.110 -0.027 -0.326 0.305 0.046
(4.87)** (1.15) (2.14)* (2.95)** (2.88)** (0.80)
spec -0.353 -4.479 -0.512 0.156 -2.879 0.137
(0.64) (6.00)** (3.22)** (1.45) (13.74)** (4.44)**
struct -0.243 -1.101 -0.177 1.144
(0.86) (4.74)** (0.48) (2.81)**
EMU -0.888 0.570 -2.248 -0.020 0.011 -0.215 1.420 -2.248 0.267 -0.128
(2.28)* (2.22)* (21.13)** (0.56) (0.79) (0.59) (4.09)** (21.13)** (1.53) (6.56)**
Observations 363 363 532 363 380 532 532 532 532 570
Groups 152 152 190 152 153 190 190 190 190 190
R
2 0.18 0.62 0.66 0.10 0.0003 0.10 0.52 0.66 0.08 0.29
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Constant and exogenous controls not reported
4




1991–1995 non EMU 1.656 0.715 1.061
EMU 1.178 0.782 0.395
1995–1999 non EMU 1.396 0.676 0.610
EMU 1.251 0.810 0.713
1999–2004 non EMU -0.048 2.423 1.638
EMU 2.545 -5.556 -0.068
Table 10: R&D intensity, ﬁnancial integration and sectoral growth
sectoral market value sectoral employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dependent variable growth share growth growth share growth
share -0.005 -0.008 0.025 0.036
(0.13) (0.20) (0.08) (0.11)
ﬁn int · R&D intensity 0.005 0.019 0.001 0.001 -0.049 -0.049 -0.050 -0.049
(0.64) (1.71) (1.16) (1.37) (1.85) (1.80) (1.86) (1.82)
EMU · R&D intensity 0.072 0.001 0.070 0.068
(1.20) (0.31) (0.56) (0.55)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 167 167 167 167 144 144 144 144
R
2 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.59 0.59 0.49 0.49
Absolute value of robust t statistics in parentheses.
Constant and dummies not reported
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